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Diversity Jurisdiction and Limited Partnerships
INTRODUCTION
When an unincorporated association sues or is sued in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction, the association's citizenship is
deemed to be the citizenship of its members. In actions involving
one type of unincorporated association, the limited partnership,
two circuit courts have reached opposite conclusions as to
whether identity of citizenship between a limited partner and an
adverse party defeats such federal jurisdiction. In 1966, the Second Circuit held in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & C0.l that
when state statutes prohibit limited partners from being parties
to actions by or against the partnership, the citizenship of the
limited partners will not defeat diversity jurisdiction. The Third
Circuit's recent decision in Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria
Savings and Loan Association2 disagreed sharply with that result.
The Carlsberg Resources majority called such a position an unwarranted extension of diversity jurisdiction to "hitherto uncovered broad categories of litigant^."^
The analysis of both opinions was inadequate, especially because neither recognized that the whole question results from a
unique configuration of the rules for determining citizenship and
two facets of the rules of capacity to sue-the capacity of the
partners to sue or be sued as individuals and the capacity of the
partnership to sue or be sued as an entity. This Comment will
examine this alignment of citizenship and capacity rules as they
relate to limited partnerships and will identify the policy considerations relevant to a resolution of the conflict between the Second and Third Circuits on the question of whether the citizenship
of the limited partners must be considered in determining the
citizenship of the partnership.
A.

Citizenship

Except in cases involving foreign states or their citizens or
subjects, the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is restricted by the constitution and by statute to actions between
1. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
2. 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
3. Id. at 1259. This language was borrowed from United Steelworkers v. R.H.Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965).
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citizens of different states.j In defining "citizen," the Supreme
Court held in an early decision, Bank of the United States u.
D e v e a u ~that
, ~ an artificial person could not be a citizen and that
the citizenship of such a person was deemed to be the citizenship
of all its members. Although the Supreme Court later reversed
itself and for a time considered corporations to be citizens,' the
Deveaux holding was revived in theory (though not in practice)
in Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Marshall reaffirmed
the rule that an artificial entity cannot be a citizen, but created
the fiction, and raised it to the level of a conclusive presumption,
that all the corporate stockholders were residents of the state that
created the corporation. In 1958, the diversity jurisdiction statute
was amended to give corporations citi~enship.~
Unincorporated associations, on the other hand, were denied
citizenship as entities because the Marshall fiction did not apply
to them. Beginning in 1889, the Supreme Court was urged in a
series of cases to extend to unincorporated associations the benefits of the jurisdictional standards applied to corporations. The
, ~which a New York joint
first case was Chapman v. B ~ r n e yin
stock company sought to be treated as a corporation. In 1900, a
Pennsylvania limited partnership argued in Great Southern Fire
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jonesl0 that it should have citizenship. Finally,
citizenship status was urged for a university board of trustees in
Thomas v. Board of Trustees. l 1 In every instance, the Court held
that a noncorporate body was incapable of having a citizenship
4. U S . CONST.art. III, 4 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different states."); 28 U.S.C. 4 1332 (1970), as
amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 96-583, 5 3, 90 Stat. 2891.
5. 9 U S . (5 Cranch) 37 (1809).
6. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). For a thorough and
critical examination of the corporate citizenship question, see McGovney, A Supreme
Court Fiction-Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
(pts. 1-3), 56 HARV.L. REV.853, 1090, 1225 (1943). McGovney concluded that the extension of diversity jurisdiction to corporations was unconstitutional and should be immediately changed by either the Court or the Congress.
7. 57 U.S. (16 HOW.)314, 325-29 (1854).
8. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 4 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 4
1332(c) (1970)). The statute specifies that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place
of business."
9. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
10. 177 U.S. 449 (1900). Although the partnership in that case was denominated a
limited partnership, there was apparently no difference in status among the partners. In
that significant aspect it was different from the modern limited partnership. Carlsberg
Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1264 (3d Cir. 1977).
11. 195 U S . 207 (1904).
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of its own, thus refusing to enlarge the Marshall fiction to include
unincorporated associations.
The result, now the general rule as to noncorporate entities,
is that an unincorporated association has an aggregate citizenship
(that of its individual members) rather than citizenship as an
entity.12The effect of this rule is to greatly reduce the availability
of federal diversity jurisdiction to partnerships, labor unions, and
other noncorporate bodies. Despite abundant criticism of the distinction between corporate and noncorporate entities13 and an
apparent deviation from the general rule in Puerto Rico v. Russell
& Co.,l4 the Supreme Court in 1965 upheld the validity of the rule
in United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.15

B. Capacity to Sue
As it pertains to unincorporated associations, the question of
capacity to sue or be sued has two facets: (1)the capacity of the
entity to sue in its common name, and (2) the capacity of the
individual members to be parties to actions by or against the
association, whether brought in the common name or in the name
of various members. Capacity to sue or be sued in federal court
is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).16This rule
provides that in actions by or against an individual not acting in
a representative capacity, the individual's capacity is governed
by the law of his domicile; in actions brought by or against unincorporated associations in which jurisdicition is based on diversity of citizenship, however, the court determines the associa-

-

12. E.g., United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965); Jett v.
Phillips & Assocs., 439 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
13. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1964)
(joint stock company deemed to have sufficient legal personality to be treated as having
citizenship for diversity purposes; court rejected Chapman's "mechanical rule of label
denomination"); Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 371-72 & n.7 (3d Cir.
1948) (court allowed joint stock company to be sued under diversity jurisdiction despite
having a member in the same state in which plaintiff was domiciled; court stated that
the Chapman rule "is itself beginning to show signs of being outmoded"); 3A MOORE'S
PRACTICE
17.25, at 17-259 to 265, 17-362to 363 (2d ed. 1977);Comment, Unions
FEDERAL
as Juridical Persons, 66 YALE
L.J. 712, 742-44 (1957). But see Brocki v. American Express
Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir.) (accepting and applying the general rule), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 871 (1960).
14. 288 U.S. 476 (1933). In that case an unincorporated sociedad en comandita was
found to have capacity for citizenship because it had a complete lega1,personality in its
civil law environment.
15. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). Russell was distinguished in Bouligny because of the problem
"of fitting an exotic creation of the civil law . . . into a federal scheme which knew it not."
Id. at 151.
16. FED.R. CIV.P. 17(b).
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tion's capacity to sue or be sued by reference to the law of the
state in which the federal court is sitting."
Even though state law may give an unincorporated association the capacity to sue or be sued as an entity, this does not give
the association citizenship in the federal jurisdictional sense.
Capacity to sue as an entity is a quality totally distinct from the
possession of citizenship as an entity? Although corporations
were deemed to have citizenship largely because they had the
capacity to sue as entities,19 the opposite conclusion has been
reached with respect to noncorporate associations: "The capacity
of the partners to sue and be sued in their partnership name does
not confer a citizenship on the partnership. "20

C. Limited Partnerships
Limited partnerships are "creatures of ~tatute."~'
According
to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which has been adopted
in 49 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin I ~ l a n d sa, ~ ~
limited partnership is composed of at least one general partner,
who manages the firm and incurs the same liability as would a
partner in a general partnership, and any number of limited partners." These limited partners contribute capital, share in profits,
and, as long as they exercise no control over the partnership management, enjoy liability limited to the amount of their investment.24One area of firm management in which the Uniform Limited Partnership Act specifically restricts limited partners is that
of legal actions by or against the partnership: "A contributor,
unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings
by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce
a limited partner's right against or liability to the partner~hip."~~
17. Id.; Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 337-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
864 (1958).
18. See, e.g., Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 338, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U S . 864 (1958); cf. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867,870 (3d Cir. 1968) (distinction
made between citizenship and capacity in action involving a personal representative, not
an unincorporated association), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
19. Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325-29 (1854).
20. Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Accord,
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1900).
21. Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197, 111N.E.2d 878, 881 (1953); Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1939).
22. 6 UNIFORM
LAWSANNOTATED
83 (Supp. 1977).
23. UNIFORM
LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP
ACT § § 1, 9.
24. Id. § § 4 , 7 , 10, 17,22,26.
25. Id. 5 26.
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While this restriction is not without judicially created except i o n ~it, ~is~well-recognized and generally followed.27
APPLICATION
OF CITIZENSHIP
AND CAPACITY
RULESTO
11. JUDICIAL
LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS

A.

The Cases from Colonial Realty to Carlsberg Resources

The incapacity of limited partners under state law appears
to be the major reason why the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty
held that identity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the
limited partners of the defendant limited partnership would not
defeat diversity jurisdicti~n.~~
Aftirming the decision of the court
below, the circuit court adopted the rule that, absent a claim that
the partnership was insolvent, an action against a limited partnership would be considered to be against the general partners
only .29
In Woodward v. D.H.Overmyer CO.,~O
the Second Circuit
made it explicit that Colonial Realty applied only to limited partnerships and that the long-standing rule that the court looks to
the partners' citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was
not altered as to general partnerships. Woodward was cited, and
Colonial Realty implicitly followed, in Erving v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club.31In holding that it had jurisdiction of the action
against the defendant limited partnership by virtue of diversity
of citizenship, the Erving court stated that "[flor purposes of
diversity jurisdiction the citizenship of the general partners is
~ontrolling."~~
In addition to the Woodward and Erving holdings,
dicta in several district court opinions have recognized the
Colonial Realty rule.33
26. E.g., Linder v. Vogue Inv., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 2d 338, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1966)
(allowing discretionary intervention); Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540,
223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966) (holding that limited partners may sue when
general partners wrongfully refuse to do so).
27. E.g., Ga.-Pak Lumber Co. v. Nalley, 337 So. 2d 1270 (Miss. 1976);Silver v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 44 App. Div. 2d 797, 355 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1974); Lieberman v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Wash. 2d 922, 385 P.2d 53 (1963).
28. 358 F.2d a t 183-84.
29. Id. The district court opinion is reported at [I9641 FED. SEC.L. REP.(CCH) 7
91,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
30. 428 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971).
31. 349 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. Id.
33. C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp.
446, 449 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Sands v. Geller, 321 F. Supp. 558, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Garfield & Co. v. Wiest, 308 F. Supp. 1107, 1108 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971).
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In Carlsberg Resources, the Third Circuit specifically rejected the reasoning and holding of Colonial Realty and found
instead that because 38 of the plaintiffs 1500 limited partners
had identity of citizenship with the defendant, the district court
had properly ruled that it had no jurisdiction based on d i v e r ~ i t y . ~ ~
To hold otherwise, said the appellate court, would be detrimental
to considerations of judicial economy and principles of federalism35and would make diversity jurisdiction in such situations
"dependent upon the vagaries of state law."36Judge Hunter dissented from the majority view and urged the court to follow
Colonial Realty because, in his words, "tak[ing] cognizance, for
diversity purposes, of persons who . . . are clearly prohibited
from taking part in a suit by or against the partnership . . .
appeals neither to logic nor to common sense."37
Colonial Realty and Carlsberg Resources suggest two ways of
deciding whether the citizenship of the limited partners must be
considered in determining the citizenship of the partnership. The
first method is to determine whether capacity rules should be
considered in making the jurisdictional determination. The second is to decide whether the general rule as to unincorporated
associations applies to modern limited partnerships without modification.

B. Use of Capacity Rules
i n the Jurisdictional Determination
1. Identification of the party prior to the application of capacity
rules
The position of the Carlsberg Resources majority can be summarized as follows: One of the parties to this lawsuit is an unincorporated association. It is well-settled that for diversity purposes the court should look to the citizenship of all the members
of an unincorporated association. If there is identity of citizenship
between any association member and an adverse party, the court
has no jurisdiction. Once the court's lack of jurisdiction is established, the operation of capacity rules cannot create jurisdiction.
The dissent disagreed that the identity of the party is known
when a limited partnership sues or is sued in federal court and
felt that it is insufficient merely to say that the party is an unin34.
35.
36.
37.

554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1262. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
554 F.2d at 1261.

Id. at 1265.
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corporated association. The dissent would look behind the partnership entity to examine the capacity of each member to see who
is really a party.3s
The fundamental conflict, then, between the majority and
the dissent on the use of capacity rules in the jurisdictional determination arises out of the question whether the court can identify
the party for diversity purposes prior to applying capacity rules.
The majority responded to the question with an unsupported
generalization: "[Ilssues pertaining to the capacity to sue, while
hardly lacking in significance, are deserving of consideration only
after the jurisdiction of the federal court has been firmly establi~hed."~YJ?hat
response is inadequate when it is recognized that
the issue in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg Resources arises from
a unique configuration of the rules of citizenship and capacity as
they relate to entities and individuals. First, as to citizenship, the
entity is incapable of having citizenship (except by reference to
the citizenship of its members), but the individuals who compose
the entity do have citizenship. Second, as to capacity, the entity
has the capacity to sue or be sued while some members of the
entity lack such capacity individually. Finally, those members
who individually lack capacity are those whose citizenship would
destroy diversity.
A careful evaluation of this alignment of citizenship and capacity rules leads to the conclusion that whenever an unincorporated association is in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, it
is because of the operation of entity capacity rules. Because an
unincorporated association does not have citizenship, it can invoke diversity jurisdiction only because a group of real people
having citizenship are bound together as a juridical entity and are
given capacity as an entity to sue or be sued.40Thus, capacity
rules are used to mold a group of individuals into an aggregate
party in actions involving noncorporate entities. Since it is inaccurate to assert that capacity rules are relevant only after jurisdiction has been established, that assertion is certainly insufficient to justify denying the application of individual capacity
rules.
The Carlsberg Resources dissent's response to the question
whether the court can identify the party for diversity purposes
prior to applying capacity rules was an argument that real parties
38. Id. a t 1263-64.
39. Id. a t 1260.
40. See notes 4-15 and accompanying text supra.
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are "those who have the capacity to bring suit."41Although this
may be a good argument for "counting" only the general partners,
it does not explain why the partnership entity should not be
considered the "real party," since the partnership has the capacity to sue. Perhaps the best reason for arguing that it is insufficient for diversity jurisdiction purposes to identify a party merely
as a noncorporate entity is that the entity has no citizenship of
its own and therefore the court's jurisdiction must ultimately
hinge on individual citizenship. If jurisdiction depends on individual citizenship, it seems reasonable to refer to individual capacity rules. While the dissent seemed to sense the rationale,42the
argument was never articulated.
2. Reference to state law

Presumably because of Federal Rule 17(b), the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty would refer to state capacity-to-sue rules
to determine which members of the partnership are really parties
for citizenship purposes.43The Carlsberg Resourses majority
argued that referring to capacity in diversity determinations
would mean referring to "the vagaries of state lawwd4
for resolution of a strictly federal issue, the jurisdiction of federal courts.
"Availability of diversity jurisdiction," the majority said,
"ordinarily should not rest upon considerations of state law but
rather upon uniform and readily cognizable principles of general
application. "45
The majority's refusal to refer to state law, however, is illfounded. Rule 17(b) clearly mandates reference to state law.
Moreover, state capacity rules are generally applied to identify
the party whose citizenship is to be "counted" for diversity purposes in representative actions." In addition, the nearly universal
41. 554 F.2d at 1263.
42. Id. at 1264-65.
43. The Second Circuit never mentioned Rule 17(b). The Third Circuit in Carlsberg
Resources, however, did discuss the rule. Id. at 1261.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. E.g., Fennel1 v. Monongahela Power Co., 350 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1965); Fallat v.
Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955) (holding that in determining the existence of diversity
of citizenship for jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of a guardian controls and not
that of the incompetent, whether or not the incompetent is the real party in interest,
provided the guardian has capacity to sue); Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D.
Vt. 1963); Meeham v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But see
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968) (limiting the Fallat holding to
situations not involving collusive manufacture of diversity), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
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adoption of section 26 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
dictates that its provisions must realistically be regarded as
"uniform and readily cognizable principles of general application."
The majority also urged that using Rule 17 in such a way that
if affects the court's jurisdiction is barred Rule 82, which specifies
that the "rules [of civil procedure] shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts."47Arguably, Rule 82 ought to be a neutral factor in resolving the issues of jurisdiction over modern limited partnerships
since the issue does not entail an extension or limitation of a
previously established jurisdiction but merely involves a clarification of jurisdictional requirements in a context of first impression. Ironically, the Third Circuit, in previously rejecting an argument similar to the one made in Carlsberg Resources, had said
that "referring to Rule 17 only to define the jurisdictional test as
already formulated would not seem to be p r ~ h i b i t e d . "Thus,
~~
Rule 82 in this context is a t best only a makeweight that reveals
the paucity of support for the court's position.
C. Applicability of the General Rule

A major thrust of the Carlsberg Resources decision was that
the general rule as to unincorporated associations should be applied strictly by requiring every member of the limited partnership to be "counted" for diversity purposes. The general rule was
developed in cases where the Supreme Court was confronted with
the entity argument-that unincorporated associations should
have a separate citizenship as do corporations. Colonial Realty
and Carlsberg Resources, however, introduce two additional variables not considered in the Supreme Court cases. First, the entity
argument was not made in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg
Resources; second, those cases involved unincorporated associations composed of members with differing status both in the firm
organizational structure and as to judicial capacity.
(1969); Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949) (adopting the "real
party in interest" test).
47. FED.R. CIV.P. 82. The majority in Carlsberg Resources misquoted this rule by
omitting the words "to limit," thereby suggesting a one-sided operation of the rule. 554
F.2d at 1261.
48. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1955). Accord, Fennel1 v. Monongahela Power Co., 350 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1965) (holding that disavowing diversity jurisdiction because plaintiff lacked capacity to sue under applicable state law did not violate
Federal Rule 82).
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The Carlsberg Resources majority recognized that Chapman
v. Barney, 49 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, and
United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, I n ~ . , ~did
l not address the
question presented in its case, but found implicit support in
Chapman for the proposition that "considerations of varying
membership status should not bear on the fundamental inquiry
whether diversity e x i s t ~ . " ~ ~ . T support
his
was based on the fact
that the joint stock company in Chapman had authority to bring
suit in the name of its president." This support is inconclusive,
however, since there is no indication that the other firm members
were incapable of being parties to a suit brought by the firm or
that the Court or the parties were concerned with anything more
than the entity argument.
The Third Circuit also cited Bouligny as justification for
taking the "rather hard line" that every single member of the
limited partnership must be "counted" in the diversity determination.54This reliance on Bouligny is also questionable. Not only
was the argument before the Supreme Court in that case an entity argument, but a major reason why the Court declined to expand the Marshall rule55to noncorporate entities was because of
the enormous practical problems presented by such an expan~ i o nThe
. ~ ~great burden of fashioning a test for determining the
state of which a typical local-national union is a citizen was only
one of those diffi~ulties.~'
The Court felt that these problems
49. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
50. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
51. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
52. 554 F.2d at 1264.
53. Chapman involved a joint stock company that had filed a diversity action alleging
that it was a citizen of New York. The action was brought in the name of Barney, the
company president, as allowed by state law, but the complaint failed to allege the citizenship of the president or any of the members of the firm. The Supreme Court held that
because the company was not a corporation, it could not be a citizen, and that since the
record did not show the citizenship of the president or the members, the lower court had
no jurisdiction. 129 U S . at 682.
54. 554 F.2d at 1259.
55. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
56. 382 U.S. at 150-53. That burden was candidly recognized: "If we were to accept
petitioner's urgent invitation to amend diversity jurisdiction so as to accommodate its
case, we would be faced with difficulties which we could not adequately resolve." Id. at
152.
57. Other difficulties were the problem of determining whether the union in that case
was sufficiently typical or representative to form the basis of devising a new rule, the
difficulty of foreseeing the long-range and widespread implications of such an expansion,
and the trouble of deciding whether other rules applied to corporations would also apply
to noncorporate bodies. Id. a t 152-53.
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should be left to the legislative branch to resolve.58There are no
such difficulties with the issue in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg
Resources because the citizenship of the limited partnership may
be determined without tampering with the present definition of
citizenship. The only findings necessary to implement the
Colonial Realty decision, identification of the general partners
and determination of their citizenship, would be extremely simple and well within the capability of any court. For these reasons,
it is inaccurate to assert that Bouligny mandates that the general
rule must be strictly interpreted so as to require that every member of the limited partnership be "counted."

Resolution of the conflict between the positions of the Second
and Third Circuits must include examination of principles of
federalism and questions of policy. The majority in Carlsberg
Resources asserted that the exercise of diversity jurisdiction in
that case would be detrimental to the federal system in that it
would infringe upon the power of the states to resolve conflict^.^^
Since the same is true of any exercise of diversity jurisdiction, this
assertion simply criticizes the entire notion of such federal jurisdiction. While that criticism has some validity, it should be kept
in mind that there are other considerations that support the exercise of diversity j u r i s d i c t i ~ n These
.~
must also be weighed along
with any detriment to the states.
Another major argument of the Carlsberg Resources majority
was that there is a powerful and pervasive policy against expanding diversity jurisdiction because of its detrimental effect on judicial economy? This argument, however, reduces to one for
federal judicial economy, because approximately the same
amount of judicial resources would be expended whether the case
58. Id. at 152.
59. 554 F.2d at 1257.
60. Some considerations that have been suggested include avoidance of local prejudice against out-of-state litigants, encouragement of commercial investment, availability
of federal procedural advantages, and achievement of uniformity of decision in commercial law, conflicts of law, and international law. See generally AMERICANLAW INSTITUTE,
OF JURISDICTION
BETWEENSTATEAND FEDERAL
COURTS
99-110, 458STUDYOF THE DIVISION
64 (1969); Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV.L. REV.483
(1928); Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A
Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HAFW. L. REV. 1426, 1445-51 (1964); Note, Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction-Citizenship for Unincorporated Associations, 19 VAND.L. REV.
984, 987-89 (1966).
61. 554 F.2d at 1256-57.
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were tried in federal or state court. Serious questions of judicial
integrity would be raised if questions of workload and the size of
the federal docket were given undue emphasis in making jurisdictional determinations. To the extent that the argument for judicial economy includes judges' concern for the size of their own
workload, it should be disregarded.
Other policy considerations make the nature of the artificial
person relevant to the jurisdictional determination. Entities with
functionally similar structure-e.g., limited partnerships and
corporations-should receive similar treatment, regardless of
their denomination as corporate or noncorporate. This argument
essentially urges the considerations of basic fairness and substance over form. Normally such an argument runs afoul of the
traditions against redefining citizenship to include artificial persons other than corporation^.^^ Those difficulties, however, are
not encountered in affording limited partnerships treatment more
akin to that given corporations (more ready access to federal
courts) because there is no need to tamper with the definition of
citizenship in reaching the Colonial Realty result. Thus, a policy
of similar treatment for entities of similar structure can be followed.

IV. CONCLUSION
The widespread use of limited partnerships makes it certain
that the issue faced in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg Resources
will present itself again, and the question of the availability of
diversity jurisdiction to such entities will then need to be decided.
While giving limited partnerships their own citizenship seems to
be precluded by Bouligny, serious questions as to both the applicability of the noncorporate entity general rule and the necessity
of using individual capacity rules to identify the parties whose
citizenship should be "counted" for diversity purposes suggest
that Colonial Realty be followed. Considerations of consistency
and judicial integrity also direct that the identity of citizenship
between limited partners and an adverse party not defeat federal
diversity jurisdiction.
62. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. R.H.Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).

